Author: Barry

Statement from the International Strategy Center in South Korea

On April 4th, the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the National Assembly’s impeachment against President Yoon. Yoon Suk-yeol is now ex-President Yoon. As he delivered the verdict, the acting Chief Justice rebutted Yoon’s defense and upheld the charge of gravely violating the constitution through: his declaration of martial law; the first Military Command Decree; obstruction of the National Assembly by mobilizing the military and police; the warrantless search of the National Election Commission; and the order to arrest politicians, legal professionals, and journalists. Yet, if the verdict was delivered in the court, the fight was waged in the streets during the past 122 days.

Immediately after martial law was declared on December 3rd, people rose up to protect democracy, refusing to be pulled back into a past where dictators wrested power from the people by declaring martial law. Despite thousands being killed when martial law was last declared in 1980, when Yoon declared martial law on live television, ordinary people stopped their lives and rushed to protect the National Assembly. Anecdotes abound of delivery workers rushing over with helmets still on, or of people hopping on cabs even amidst unwinding for the night. Even as armored vehicles, helicopters, and armed commandos invaded the National Assembly, the protestors outside expanded. Their resistance against the mobilized soldiers and police allowed the National Assembly to revoke martial law and more importantly let Yoon know that people would not be intimidated. Night after night, people took to the streets peacefully but resolutely. Around the world, people sent messages of solidarity and held protests, letting not only Yoon know that they were watching, but also letting those braving the freezing cold know that they were not alone. 

That first weekend a million people enveloped the National Assembly only for the National Assembly to fail to achieve the quorum to impeach Yoon. Every night after that, people came out lighting the darkness with candles and K-pop glow sticks, christening the protests “the revolution of lights.” And so, the scales finally tipped in favor of impeachment in the National Assembly. Later, when Yoon resisted the investigation and the police’s timid efforts failed to arrest him, people camped out for days by his residence, through rain and snow, wrapped in aluminum heat blankets. And so, the public officials overcame their timidity and finally succeeded in arresting Yoon. For over 4 months, South Koreans spent their Saturdays in the streets demanding Yoon’s impeachment. Communities and movements—workers, the LGBTQ community, minorities, women, the disabled, farmers—flew their banners in solidarity. 

Yet, removing ex-President Yoon from office is just the beginning. The 2016 candlelight protests that overthrew ex-President Park Geun-hye showed us that cutting off the head is not enough. We must uproot its systemic corruption. Fortunately, during those 122 days, as Koreans suffered snow, rain, and cold, we also experienced the warmth of solidarity and power. 

We have climbed one peak. Now, we must address the crisis of representative democracy and guarantee the rights of workers and minorities. Looking at our next peak, we are invigorated by the belief that our struggle is not just our own: just as we have been inspired and shaped by struggles from across time and place, we know our struggles and victories can also contribute to other struggles around the world. Toojeng!

The above statement was published in Korean and English here on Istagram.

By Vijay Prashad

The whole thing is a fiasco. The theatrical drama in the White House’s Oval Office triggered a series of predictable responses around the world. Outrage at US President Donald Trump for his rudeness and ridicule for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were some of the reactions. Then, the failure of French President Emmanuel Macron to create a European agreement with the United Kingdom’s Keir Starmer and Zelenskyy revealed the absolute dead ends that confront this exhausted war in Ukraine. The question that these discussions provoke is simple: is there an exit for this war?

Permanent war

If the war aims of Zelenskyy and his European partners are to weaken Russia or to overthrow the government of Vladimir Putin, then this war might either go on forever or accelerate into a dangerous nuclear scenario. Opinion polls in Russia show that Putin’s approval rating is now at 87%. Even with a mountain of salt, this is far higher than the approval rating in France for Macron. With Russia’s economy resilient during this war, it is unlikely that it will be further weakened with the continuation of hostilities. What the evidence shows, however, is that Europe’s economy is suffering from war inflation that has not been reduced. If this war is to continue, Macron said, then European states would have to increase their military spending to 3% or 3.5% of their GDP. This would further damage the living situation of most Europeans. Would young, working-class Europeans be willing to go and man the dangerous frontline in Ukraine on behalf of a war aim (weakening Russia) that is impossible? It is unlikely. (There is a separate cruelty of middle-class Ukrainians fleeing the country for Western Europe and then working-class Western Europeans being asked to come and defend that country for them).

A permanent war will lead to unnecessary loss of life in Ukraine and to a permanent economic crisis in Europe. It is also unlikely because the United States will not financially and militarily back such a war indefinitely, resulting in the collapse of any long-term European commitment to Ukraine.

The Korean solution

If neither Ukraine nor Russia are willing to move to a ceasefire and then a negotiated settlement (which would include security guarantees for all sides), then there is the possibility that the current frontline that stretches from northern to eastern Ukraine will become a permanent Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Ukraine would thereby be divided indefinitely with an immense waste of social wealth to maintain a perpetual frontline. This is the most likely scenario, although it might not be palatable for Europeans to have a Korea within their continent.

The South Korean military maintains 600,000 troops along the 38th Parallel, alongside almost 30,000 US troops. Much the same is the situation in the north. Billions of dollars are spent annually on surveillance and logistics for over 900 square miles of territory that is not available for economic use. Europe would have to underwrite this Korean solution for Ukraine for eternity (just as the United States provides guarantees and funds to South Korea, and China does the same for North Korea).

A security consortium

The Helsinki Process that emerged to bring the US and USSR into negotiations in 1975 and that formed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has played almost no role for peace in the war on Ukraine.

The only interlocutors that have been given permission to speak about the war in Ukraine on behalf of Zelenskyy have been the United States, the Western European leaders, the leaders of the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Leaders from Europe’s east – apart from those who are integrated into the NATO-EU – have been either silent or told that their opinions do not matter. But it is these eastern European countries that share with Ukraine the fact of having a border with Russia, and it is these countries that most need to form a security consortium that includes Russia and provides mutual guarantees. Those countries that directly share a border with Russia’s west are – from north to south – Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (Lithuania and Poland share a border with the Kaliningrad Oblast, which is a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea). Three of them (Finland, Estonia, and Latvia) are members of NATO and of the EU, while one of them (Norway) is a NATO member but not in the EU.

Would it be possible for these eight countries to call a conference with Russia on the broader issues of security rather than the narrow issue of Ukraine? That three countries that border Russia are already NATO members (one of them, Norway, was a founding member in 1949) suggests that the problems in Ukraine are separate from NATO membership itself. Rather, they stem from anxiety about a border line created in a hurry when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (this impacts Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, but not Norway and Finland, which were not part of the Soviet Union).

In the early 1980s, former Swedish Prime Minister Olao Palme chaired the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, whose 1982 report Common Security: A Program for Disarmament made the case that ‘The task of diplomacy is to limit, split, and subdivide conflicts, not to generalize and aggregate them’. In other words, all conflicts cannot be settled at the same time. A ceasefire is good in itself; the issues to resolve need to be separated, and those that are easier dealt with first to build confidence. To bundle all issues into one problem makes a dispute intractable.

The countries that border each other, including those that border Russia to its south and east, must live next to each other. They cannot lift themselves out of their geography and go elsewhere. Ukraine cannot be relocated to France. It must remain beside Russia. In that case, these countries need to find a way to build trust.

To begin with, the assertion that one cannot trust a neighbor is the worst way to build confidence between the peoples of neighboring countries. Neither the EU nor NATO (without full US military backing) can subordinate Russia and force it to bow before Ukraine. A British cabinet minister said last year that his country would last only six months in a full-scale war with Russia. Meanwhile, a Kiel Institute for the World Economy report suggests that Germany is spending its money buying weapons but does not have a standing army capable of self-defense, let alone winning an offensive war against Russia. Europe, without the United States, is a shadow.

It would behoove all parties if a country that borders Russia calls for such a security consortium to be built and if it is able to get guarantees from NATO not to expand further eastward and from Russia to draw back its military from the border regions. There are long relations among these countries, with families on both sides of the border. Any lessened tension in general is good for humanity, and if such a maneuver will lead to peace in Ukraine, that would be far better than a permanent scar on this part of the European continent.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are On Cuba: Reflections on 70 Years of Revolution and Struggle (with Noam Chomsky), Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism, and (also with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of US Power.

This article was produced by Globetrotter and No Cold War.

By Peter Mertens

What US President Donald Trump did on February 28 to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy typically happens behind closed doors. Now, in Trump’s words, it was “great television.” This is how the US has treated countries in the Global South for years: as neo-colonies expected to meekly say “Thank you” for imposed agreements that plunder their resources. It’s no different from how Trump speaks about Panama, Greenland, or Gaza, complete with repulsive AI animations. The US sees the world as a giant globe of resources that belong to it. This has a name: imperialism. It never truly left; it has simply returned naked and unashamed, trampling the last remaining counterforce that once restrained it—international law.

Domestically, Trump does the same. He seeks to revive the 19th-century capitalism of the “robber barons,” a capitalism without counterweights: no unions, no labor protections, and absolute power to make decisions affecting millions, up to and including deportation. To win this war, he has enlisted Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) team.

Zelenskyy’s calm and controlled demeanor in the face of the world’s most powerful president commanded respect, particularly among Global South nations all too familiar with US bullying. But this brings us no closer to peace. “The unwinnable war,” I wrote in Mutiny, “has already fed tens of thousands of young men into the meat grinder at the dawn of their lives.” On the eve of the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting, a deal seemed imminent through which Trump would shift the cost of war to Europe while the US would receive control over Ukraine’s resource-and-mineral extraction via a new fund. This laid bare that this dirty war was never about values—only geostrategic interests and control over resources and fertile land. The question is: Why did the deal collapse at the last minute?

One possibility is that the US aims to further weaken Zelenskyy’s position, humiliate him, and ultimately push for regime change. This has been the hallmark of US foreign policy for decades: orchestrating regime changes whenever and wherever US interests are deemed unserved. This was the fate of Manuel Noriega in Panama and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. One day, a trusted ally; the next, overthrown. Former US diplomat Jeffrey Sachs reminded me last week of an alleged Henry Kissinger quote: “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”

Even one of the United States’ strongest allies, the European Union, is learning this. In September 2023, I wrote in Mutiny that Europe is losing the continent precisely because it blindly follows Washington. “It’s a kind of Stockholm syndrome,” I told Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever in Parliament last week. “The more the US humiliates Europe, the tighter Europe clings to Uncle Sam’s coattails.” Our Defense Minister, Theo Francken, insists on maintaining privileged ties with Washington at all costs, claims inspiration from the US “social model,” finds it normal for Trump to attempt to annex Greenland, and happily wants to order more unaffordable F-35 fighter jets from the US.

How many shocks does Europe need for it to grow up? The German recession post-sanctions wasn’t enough. Elon Musk’s meddling in election campaigns? Not enough. Humiliation by US Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in Munich? Still not enough. Trump’s new tariff war? Even less. Today, Europe’s establishment panics again, charging off like a wild horse escaping a barn—more weapons, more war, preparing for World War III! Europe must not become a clone of the US. It does not need a domestic Trump. Instead, it must dare to chart a new course.

Meanwhile, the EU’s Foreign Minister Kaja Kallas insists in statements on prolonging the dirty war in Ukraine, feeding it with weapons and young men and women. Kallas lacks the democratic legitimacy to engage in such incendiary talk. Europe needs fewer warmongers like Kallas and more maturity to truly change course and unite with Global South nations like Brazil and China, which have long pursued negotiated solutions.

As I wrote in Mutiny, this war has always been Janus-faced. On one side is the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the flouting of international law through Russian aggression. Global South nations understand this. On the other is a US-Russia proxy war on Ukraine’s soil, where tens of thousands of young people are cannon fodder for geostrategic conflict. Washington now shamelessly admits this was a proxy war fueled by the US. Trump, however, claims it was the “wrong” proxy war—that Russia isn’t the US’s real adversary, and all efforts must shift to the coming war his administration is preparing against China. This is solely because Washington sees its economic and technological hegemony challenged by China.

The latest fashionable sophistry is that “if you want peace, prepare for war”. It sounds catchy but is catastrophic. History shows that when economies gear for war and minds are primed for conflict, war draws closer. Step by step, hysteria replaces sober analysis. More politicians chirp about war; fewer dare speak of peace. Thinking stops, diplomatic solutions are dismissed, and global peace is gambled away. Europe has no future as a war continent. Militarization will gut its manufacturing industry, and permanent tension with eastern neighbors won’t inch us closer to peace.

“My experience teaches that you must talk to the other side. You can’t say, ‘We won’t talk—we know what they think.’ Diplomacy is essential, especially in tense moments,” Jeffrey Sachs told me.

Europe must find its own path. Russia isn’t moving; you can’t erase it from the map. Instead of sinking deeper into the vortex of hysteria and platitudes, Europe must develop mature diplomacy – one that charts an independent course with a vision for its manufacturing sector, respect for international law, and pragmatic relations with all economic giants: the US, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa.

Peter Mertens is General Secretary of the PVDA-PTB (Workers’ Party of Belgium) and a member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. His latest book, from LeftWord Books (India), is Mutiny: How Our World is Tilting (2024).

This article was produced by Globetrotter and previously published here by Peoples Dispatch.

By Wang Wen

The following article by Wang Wen was originally published in Australia and then republished in 13 languages including Chinese, Arabic, English, Indonesian, Japanese, Malay, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Russian. Wang Wen is Executive Dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, Executive Director of the China-US Humanities Exchange Research Center, and an influential writer on foreign affairs in China. It therefore represents an important analysis of the new Trump presidency from a Chinese perspective.

Donald Trump’s second term may not be all bad for all nations, including and especially China. For many Chinese internet users, Trump’s policies have unwittingly strengthened their country. This is why he has earned the popular nickname “Chuan Jianguo,” which means “Make China Great.”

Trump’s first term made at least three notable contributions to China’s rise.

First his presidency shattered the image of the US as a paragon of democracy for many Chinese, revealing political chaos and deep societal divisions. For decades some Chinese idealised the United States as a “beautiful country”: the literal translation of the Chinese name for the US. However, Trump’s actions provided what some describe as a “political lesson,” reshaping perceptions and fostering greater appreciation for China’s stability and governance.

Second, Trump helped accelerate China’s push toward technological independence. Over 20 years ago, the Chinese government began promoting innovation in science and technology, though many believed there were no borders in this field.

It wasn’t until events like the 2018 arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou and the crackdown on Chinese tech firms that the country fully committed to innovation. By 2024, China had achieved significant strides in tech independence, including breakthroughs in semiconductor manufacturing. This shift was underscored by record-high chip exports in 2024, which surpassed $159 billion, doubling 2018 figures.

Third, Trump’s tariffs and trade restrictions pushed China to strengthen its ties with the non-Western world. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, China deepened its relationships with Global South nations. Between 2018 and 2024, trade with these nations grew by over 40 percent, while China’s reliance on the US for trade fell from 17 to 11 percent.

Trump’s trade war with China has driven a rapid restructuring of global trade, leading more Chinese to recognise that the world is far larger than the United States.

Looking back, the combined experience of Trump’s first term and Biden’s policies to contain China over eight years has strengthened the country in the medium term.

From a long-term perspective, China has gained a strategic psychological advantage in dealing with Trump 2.0.

China’s media and think tanks have responded to the possibility of Trump’s return with relative calm compared to the growing anxiety in Europe and Canada. Beijing seems confident, having already weathered trade wars and technological blockades during Trump’s first term.

China won’t actively provoke Trump 2.0, but if aggressive US policies like trade wars or technology restrictions persist, China will respond with calculated countermeasures ‒ and ultimately, become even stronger.

On January 7, 2025, both China and the US experienced natural disasters. A 6.8 magnitude earthquake struck Dingri county in Tibet, while a major wildfire broke out in Los Angeles.

In Tibet, Chinese authorities swiftly transitioned from emergency response to recovery, relocating 50,000 residents within a day. Meanwhile, the wildfire in Los Angeles raged for over 10 days, worsened by political infighting and mismanagement. This stark contrast highlights the differences in governance and crisis management between the two nations.

China’s rapid response to the earthquake, efficiently moving from rescue to resettlement, stands in sharp contrast to the prolonged crisis in Los Angeles, where political leaders traded blame while the fire caused damage surpassing the 9/11 attacks. These contrasting responses underscore the weaknesses in US crisis management and governance.

While much of the non-Western world remains relatively at ease, Trump-style neo-fascism is provoking panic across the Atlantic, particularly in Europe and Canada. Questions now surface at the highest levels of international diplomacy: Will Denmark lose Greenland? Will NATO lose US military support? Will Canada become the 51st state? These once-crazy notions are now openly discussed.

For many in China, the global impact of Trump 2.0 is unlikely to surpass that of Trump 1.0.

In fact, in 2025, many in non-Western countries believe Trump 2.0 will focus mainly on domestic affairs while occasionally stirring up trouble among Western allies. Non-Western observers know full well that Trump 2.0 will not end the Russia-Ukraine conflict in one day. He will not resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute anytime soon. He will not prevent China’s long-term trade growth with 60 percent tariffs. He will not, and cannot, curb China’s continued rise.

Trump 2.0 will likely continue withdrawing from international agreements, including climate accords and the WTO. The result? The gradual disintegration of US global hegemony. If this trend continues, Trump 2.0 could push the US into regional power status, embracing isolationism.

Regardless of the scope of Trump’s impact ‒ whether through trade wars, technological conflicts, or treaty withdrawals ‒ China is well-prepared for the worst. As it has done in the past, China has the ability to turn challenges into opportunities.

By 2028 the Chinese will be more confident than ever in saying: “Thank you Trump.”