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By Wang Wen

Will there be a war between China and the United States? This question surged into popular discourse in early April, largely because China was the first country to impose strong retaliatory measures in response to Trump’s so-called “reciprocal tariff” policy.

Some now worry that the global atmosphere increasingly resembles the era of tariff wars that preceded World War II—prompting fears that economic conflict could escalate into military confrontation.

Which country might next go to war with the United States? Yemen? Iran? Perhaps a nation in Africa or Latin America? In my view, it most certainly won’t be China.

This is not because China is weak or unwilling. On the contrary, defending its national interests and dignity remains central to Beijing’s strategy in dealing with Trump’s economic provocations. On no issue will China simply yield to Donald Trump’s increasingly unrealistic demands.

Since Trump’s first term began eight years ago, China has grown acutely aware of what it sees as Washington’s hegemonic imperialism. Beijing has always preferred cooperation with the U.S., never desiring to cast it as an adversary. But if the U.S. is intent on launching a trade war, a tariff war, a tech war—or any other kind of confrontation—China is prepared to fight back.

China does not rule out cooperation with the U.S. when it is based on mutual respect and a shared interest in “win-win” outcomes. But it understands that meaningful cooperation cannot be passively pursued; it must be earned through sustained struggle.

In this latest round of tariff disputes, China’s retaliatory actions have been notably restrained, focused solely on trade. It does not want friction with the U.S. to spiral out of control. One telling sign of this is the silence of China’s top leadership—apart from statements issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, no senior official has publicly commented on Trump’s tariff moves.

This reflects a posture of strategic calm. China’s leadership has maintained a tone of resilience and rationality, demonstrating the emotional steadiness and long-term foresight of a global power.

Few now remember that, just three days before his inauguration on January 20, Trump spoke by phone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi emphasized that as two major powers with vastly different national conditions, it is inevitable that China and the U.S. will have disagreements. What matters, Xi argued, is that each side respects the other’s core interests and major concerns and finds constructive ways to resolve disputes. He also reiterated that the nature of China-U.S. economic ties lies in mutual benefit and “win-win” cooperation—warning that confrontation should not be the default path.

Indeed, China’s reluctance to enter into direct confrontation with the U.S. stems not from fear, but from deep confidence in its own growing power. It knows it would not be the loser in a conflict.

In the 1950s, China lacked an established navy and air force, and yet it fought the U.S. to a stalemate in the Korean War, forcing an American retreat to the 38th parallel. Today, the contrast is stark. China has three aircraft carriers deployed in the western Pacific and is poised to build more. It fields Dongfeng-31AG intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 12,000 kilometers, sixth-generation fighter jets, and accounts for over 70 percent of the world’s drone production. The idea of a U.S. military victory over China is increasingly unrealistic.

And the U.S. knows it. Think tanks like the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies have published simulations of possible war scenarios between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula. The conclusions are sobering: not only could the U.S. fail to win, but it could face a catastrophic defeat.

Still, why wouldn’t China, with all this power, strike first? The answer is plain: it won’t. Over the past four decades, China has never initiated conflict with the U.S. On issues ranging from Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong to the South China Sea, human rights, trade, and technology, it has consistently been Washington that has taken the first aggressive step.

Even now, in the face of what has become the world’s largest tariff war, China has shown that it can defend its interests without resorting to military means.

China’s export competitiveness remains formidable, especially in sectors such as lithium batteries and toys. Seven years ago, Trump’s initial tariffs raised the cost of Chinese goods by 20 percent. Yet, U.S. imports from China continued to rise.

According to U.S. Department of Commerce data, from January 2024 to January 2025, American exports to China dropped by $2.18 billion—an 18 percent decrease from $12.1 billion to $9.9 billion—while imports from China increased by $5.85 billion, or 16.3 percent, from $35.8 billion to $41.6 billion.

Even if tariffs were raised to 200 percent, the U.S. would still rely heavily on Chinese imports. Conversely, U.S. products such as soybeans and crude oil have limited appeal in the Chinese market. China’s retaliatory tariffs are forcing American exporters to seek new markets, with substantial losses likely for U.S. agriculture and energy sectors.

Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturers are increasingly expanding their international operations. Trump’s tariffs have had the unintended effect of pushing China’s companies toward greater globalization. Until recently, many Chinese firms had minimal international presence. Now, they’re building a global footprint. In this light, Beijing sees Trump’s trade war not as a crisis but as an opportunity.

Over the past eight years, China has amassed substantial experience in navigating its relationship with the U.S. It has concluded that the best response to Trump lies in strengthening its own internal systems. Beijing continues to pursue domestic reforms, open its economy further to international investment, break through foreign technological blockades, and attract global capital. These efforts have made China one of the world’s premier investment destinations. In this broader contest with the U.S., Beijing believes that time is on its side.

A viral cartoon on Chinese social media perfectly captured this sentiment. It showed Trump dressed in the imperial robes of the Qing Dynasty’s Empress Dowager Cixi declaring war on the world. In 1900, Cixi, convinced of her empire’s invincibility, declared war on eight major powers—only to see the Qing Dynasty collapse shortly afterward.

To many in China, the cartoon draws a clear parallel. Trump, like Cixi, appears trapped in outdated assumptions of national supremacy, failing to grasp a shifting global reality. The decline of American manufacturing and relative influence, in the eyes of many Chinese observers, began with Trump.

This is precisely why Beijing sees no need to escalate tensions. But if Washington truly loses its composure and initiates war, the result would not resemble a rerun of the Korean War—it would be far worse.

This article was previous published here by International Policy Digest.

Dr. Wang Wen is the Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University and Executive Director of the China-U.S. Research Center for People-to-People Exchange. A former journalist and op-ed editor at Global Times, he founded RDCY in 2013 after winning China’s prestigious News Award. He has taught at over 10 universities worldwide, is a member of the Valdai Discussion Club, and has conducted research in more than 100 countries. Dr. Wang has published over 50 books and 1,000 articles in outlets including People’s Daily and The New York Times, and advises key Chinese ministries.

Statement from the International Strategy Center in South Korea

On April 4th, the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the National Assembly’s impeachment against President Yoon. Yoon Suk-yeol is now ex-President Yoon. As he delivered the verdict, the acting Chief Justice rebutted Yoon’s defense and upheld the charge of gravely violating the constitution through: his declaration of martial law; the first Military Command Decree; obstruction of the National Assembly by mobilizing the military and police; the warrantless search of the National Election Commission; and the order to arrest politicians, legal professionals, and journalists. Yet, if the verdict was delivered in the court, the fight was waged in the streets during the past 122 days.

Immediately after martial law was declared on December 3rd, people rose up to protect democracy, refusing to be pulled back into a past where dictators wrested power from the people by declaring martial law. Despite thousands being killed when martial law was last declared in 1980, when Yoon declared martial law on live television, ordinary people stopped their lives and rushed to protect the National Assembly. Anecdotes abound of delivery workers rushing over with helmets still on, or of people hopping on cabs even amidst unwinding for the night. Even as armored vehicles, helicopters, and armed commandos invaded the National Assembly, the protestors outside expanded. Their resistance against the mobilized soldiers and police allowed the National Assembly to revoke martial law and more importantly let Yoon know that people would not be intimidated. Night after night, people took to the streets peacefully but resolutely. Around the world, people sent messages of solidarity and held protests, letting not only Yoon know that they were watching, but also letting those braving the freezing cold know that they were not alone. 

That first weekend a million people enveloped the National Assembly only for the National Assembly to fail to achieve the quorum to impeach Yoon. Every night after that, people came out lighting the darkness with candles and K-pop glow sticks, christening the protests “the revolution of lights.” And so, the scales finally tipped in favor of impeachment in the National Assembly. Later, when Yoon resisted the investigation and the police’s timid efforts failed to arrest him, people camped out for days by his residence, through rain and snow, wrapped in aluminum heat blankets. And so, the public officials overcame their timidity and finally succeeded in arresting Yoon. For over 4 months, South Koreans spent their Saturdays in the streets demanding Yoon’s impeachment. Communities and movements—workers, the LGBTQ community, minorities, women, the disabled, farmers—flew their banners in solidarity. 

Yet, removing ex-President Yoon from office is just the beginning. The 2016 candlelight protests that overthrew ex-President Park Geun-hye showed us that cutting off the head is not enough. We must uproot its systemic corruption. Fortunately, during those 122 days, as Koreans suffered snow, rain, and cold, we also experienced the warmth of solidarity and power. 

We have climbed one peak. Now, we must address the crisis of representative democracy and guarantee the rights of workers and minorities. Looking at our next peak, we are invigorated by the belief that our struggle is not just our own: just as we have been inspired and shaped by struggles from across time and place, we know our struggles and victories can also contribute to other struggles around the world. Toojeng!

The above statement was published in Korean and English here on Istagram.

By Vijay Prashad

The whole thing is a fiasco. The theatrical drama in the White House’s Oval Office triggered a series of predictable responses around the world. Outrage at US President Donald Trump for his rudeness and ridicule for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were some of the reactions. Then, the failure of French President Emmanuel Macron to create a European agreement with the United Kingdom’s Keir Starmer and Zelenskyy revealed the absolute dead ends that confront this exhausted war in Ukraine. The question that these discussions provoke is simple: is there an exit for this war?

Permanent war

If the war aims of Zelenskyy and his European partners are to weaken Russia or to overthrow the government of Vladimir Putin, then this war might either go on forever or accelerate into a dangerous nuclear scenario. Opinion polls in Russia show that Putin’s approval rating is now at 87%. Even with a mountain of salt, this is far higher than the approval rating in France for Macron. With Russia’s economy resilient during this war, it is unlikely that it will be further weakened with the continuation of hostilities. What the evidence shows, however, is that Europe’s economy is suffering from war inflation that has not been reduced. If this war is to continue, Macron said, then European states would have to increase their military spending to 3% or 3.5% of their GDP. This would further damage the living situation of most Europeans. Would young, working-class Europeans be willing to go and man the dangerous frontline in Ukraine on behalf of a war aim (weakening Russia) that is impossible? It is unlikely. (There is a separate cruelty of middle-class Ukrainians fleeing the country for Western Europe and then working-class Western Europeans being asked to come and defend that country for them).

A permanent war will lead to unnecessary loss of life in Ukraine and to a permanent economic crisis in Europe. It is also unlikely because the United States will not financially and militarily back such a war indefinitely, resulting in the collapse of any long-term European commitment to Ukraine.

The Korean solution

If neither Ukraine nor Russia are willing to move to a ceasefire and then a negotiated settlement (which would include security guarantees for all sides), then there is the possibility that the current frontline that stretches from northern to eastern Ukraine will become a permanent Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Ukraine would thereby be divided indefinitely with an immense waste of social wealth to maintain a perpetual frontline. This is the most likely scenario, although it might not be palatable for Europeans to have a Korea within their continent.

The South Korean military maintains 600,000 troops along the 38th Parallel, alongside almost 30,000 US troops. Much the same is the situation in the north. Billions of dollars are spent annually on surveillance and logistics for over 900 square miles of territory that is not available for economic use. Europe would have to underwrite this Korean solution for Ukraine for eternity (just as the United States provides guarantees and funds to South Korea, and China does the same for North Korea).

A security consortium

The Helsinki Process that emerged to bring the US and USSR into negotiations in 1975 and that formed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has played almost no role for peace in the war on Ukraine.

The only interlocutors that have been given permission to speak about the war in Ukraine on behalf of Zelenskyy have been the United States, the Western European leaders, the leaders of the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Leaders from Europe’s east – apart from those who are integrated into the NATO-EU – have been either silent or told that their opinions do not matter. But it is these eastern European countries that share with Ukraine the fact of having a border with Russia, and it is these countries that most need to form a security consortium that includes Russia and provides mutual guarantees. Those countries that directly share a border with Russia’s west are – from north to south – Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (Lithuania and Poland share a border with the Kaliningrad Oblast, which is a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea). Three of them (Finland, Estonia, and Latvia) are members of NATO and of the EU, while one of them (Norway) is a NATO member but not in the EU.

Would it be possible for these eight countries to call a conference with Russia on the broader issues of security rather than the narrow issue of Ukraine? That three countries that border Russia are already NATO members (one of them, Norway, was a founding member in 1949) suggests that the problems in Ukraine are separate from NATO membership itself. Rather, they stem from anxiety about a border line created in a hurry when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (this impacts Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, but not Norway and Finland, which were not part of the Soviet Union).

In the early 1980s, former Swedish Prime Minister Olao Palme chaired the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, whose 1982 report Common Security: A Program for Disarmament made the case that ‘The task of diplomacy is to limit, split, and subdivide conflicts, not to generalize and aggregate them’. In other words, all conflicts cannot be settled at the same time. A ceasefire is good in itself; the issues to resolve need to be separated, and those that are easier dealt with first to build confidence. To bundle all issues into one problem makes a dispute intractable.

The countries that border each other, including those that border Russia to its south and east, must live next to each other. They cannot lift themselves out of their geography and go elsewhere. Ukraine cannot be relocated to France. It must remain beside Russia. In that case, these countries need to find a way to build trust.

To begin with, the assertion that one cannot trust a neighbor is the worst way to build confidence between the peoples of neighboring countries. Neither the EU nor NATO (without full US military backing) can subordinate Russia and force it to bow before Ukraine. A British cabinet minister said last year that his country would last only six months in a full-scale war with Russia. Meanwhile, a Kiel Institute for the World Economy report suggests that Germany is spending its money buying weapons but does not have a standing army capable of self-defense, let alone winning an offensive war against Russia. Europe, without the United States, is a shadow.

It would behoove all parties if a country that borders Russia calls for such a security consortium to be built and if it is able to get guarantees from NATO not to expand further eastward and from Russia to draw back its military from the border regions. There are long relations among these countries, with families on both sides of the border. Any lessened tension in general is good for humanity, and if such a maneuver will lead to peace in Ukraine, that would be far better than a permanent scar on this part of the European continent.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are On Cuba: Reflections on 70 Years of Revolution and Struggle (with Noam Chomsky), Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism, and (also with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of US Power.

This article was produced by Globetrotter and No Cold War.